Author Archives: Mark Paradies
This Accident shares a “Call Back” Report from the Aviation Safety Reporting System that is applicable far beyond aviation.
In this case, the pilot was fatigued and just wanted to “get home.” He had a “finish the mission” focus that could have cost him his life. Here’s an excerpt:
I saw nothing of the runway environment…. I had made no mental accommodation to do a missed approach as I just knew that my skills would allow me to land as they had so many times in past years. The only conscious control input that I can recall is leveling at the MDA [Rather than continuing to the DA? –Ed.] while continuing to focus outside the cockpit for the runway environment. It just had to be there! I do not consciously remember looking at the flight instruments as I began…an uncontrolled, unconscious 90-degree turn to the left, still looking for the runway environment.
To read about this near-miss and the lessons learned, see:
Derailment of freight train near Angerstein Junction, south east London, 3 June 2015
At about 12:10 hrs on 3 June 2015, one wagon of an empty freight train derailed on the approach to Angerstein Junction, near Charlton in south east London. The train continued over the junction, derailing two further wagons, before it stopped on the Blackheath to Charlton line. The three derailed wagons were partly obstructing the line used by trains travelling in the opposite direction. No other trains were involved in the accident and no-one was injured, but there was significant damage to the railway infrastructure.
The wagons derailed because the leading right-hand wheel on one of them was carrying insufficient load to prevent the wheel climbing up the outer rail on a curved section of track. The insufficient load was due to a combination of the suspension on that wheel being locked in one position, a twisted bogie frame and an intended twist in the track.
As a consequence of this investigation, RAIB has made three recommendations.
The first, addressed to VTG (the wagon owner), seeks improvements to its wagon maintenance processes.
The second, also addressed to VTG, seeks liaison with industry to improve understanding of how wagon suspension wear characteristics relate to maintenance processes.
The third, addressed to Network Rail, seeks a review of infrastructure arrangements at the accident location.
The report also includes a learning point reinforcing a previous recommendation intended to encourage use of currently available wheel load data to enable identification of wagons with defects or uneven loads that are running on Network Rail’s infrastructure.
To see the complete report, go to:
The above information and report are from the UK Rail Accident Investigation Branck. See their web site at:
Contact a power line and no one is hurt. What do you do next?
Rickover talking about his famous candidate interviews …
That’s why we make the Summit FUN!
Don’t miss it! August 1-5, 2016.
More info here:
You’ve seen it hundreds of times. Something goes wrong and management starts the witch hunt. WHO is to BLAME?
Is this the best approach to preventing future problems? NO! Not by a long shot.
We’ve written about the knee-jerk reaction to discipline someone after an accident many times. Here are a few links to some of the better articles:
- Wacky Willie
- Will Discipline Fix the CTA’s Problems?
- USS Hartford / USS New Orleans Collision & Subsequent Discipline
- Should You Discipline BEFORE an Investigation is Complete?
- What Should Managers Know About Root Cause Analysis?
- Root Cause Analysis – Do it before even thinking about discipline!
Let me sum up what we know …
Always do a complete root cause analysis BEFORE you discipline someone for an incident. You will find that most accidents are NOT a result of bad people who lack discipline. Thus, disciplining innocent victims of the systems just leads to uncooperative employees and moral issues.
In the very few cases where discipline is called for after a root cause analysis, you will have the facts to justify the discipline.
For those who need to learn about effective advanced root cause analysis techniques that help you find the real causes of problems, attend out 5-Day TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis Training. See: http://www.taproot.com/courses
From Jim Whiting, one of our Australian instructors.
IOGP SAFETY ALERT
WELL CONTROL EVENT WHEN USING AN MPD SYSTEM
A High Pressure exploration gas-condensate bearing reservoir section was being drilled using automated Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD) and Rig Pump Divertor (RPD) equipment. Total gas and Connection Gas (TG/CG) peaks were noted the day before during drilling so the degasser was run. The drilled stand was backreamed at normal drilling flow rate prior to taking a MWD survey, making a connection and then taking Slow Circulating Rates (SCRs) on all 3 mud pumps. During taking SCRs an initial pit gain of 16bbl was noticed and reported.
It was suspected that pit gain was continuing, so a dynamic flow check was carried out in which it was confirmed that the well was flowing. Subsequently the well was shut in on the BOP (SICP=5,800psi, SIDPP=0psi). Dual float valves behind the bit were holding; total pit gain was estimated at 306bbls. Due to high casing pressure/MAASP concerns, an attempt was made to lower the annulus casing pressure by bleeding off gas through the choke and ‘poor boy’ mud-gas separator (MGS). This attempt was quickly aborted due to inadequate choke control leading to loss of the MGS liquid seal (SICP=7,470psi, SIDPP=0psi (floats holding).
After mobilization of high pressure bleed down facilities, the casing pressure was successfully reduced to zero psi through the “Lubricate and Bleed” well control method.
What Went Wrong?
During “pump off” events the Bottom Hole Pressure (BHP) dropped below Pore Pressure (Po) which resulted in initial small influxes into the wellbore. These were not recognized and therefore not reported as and when they occurred.
In MPD-RPD mode, fluid density dropped below the setpoint of 16.6 ppg (0.86 psi/ft) during pump off events (first and second survey and connections) due to a ‘sluggish’ RPD auto-choke. The RPD system had not been properly calibrated and the choke not run in the optimum position for effective control.
The formation pressure gradient of the gas-condensate bearing reservoir was evaluated to be 0.84psi/ft (Po~13,950psi).
Corrective Actions and Recommendations:
- Comprehensive and clear communication and action protocols (eg. close-in) should be tested, and verified as effective, across all Crews and Shifts.
- Drillers must be clear that immediately on detecting an influx, they need to shut-in the well (applies for both MPD and non-MPD operations). The deployment of MPD does not change this basic principle.
- Choke drills (A/B Crews and Day/Night shifts), including operation of remote choke(s) through a remote choke control panel, are critical to verifying that the total system (equipment, procedures, people including actions and communication protocols) are effective to operate the chokes against the maximum anticipated casing pressure.
Safety Alert Number: 272
IOGP Safety Alerts http://safetyzone.iogp.org/
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication, neither the IOGP nor any of its members past present or future warrants its accuracy or will, regardless of its or their negligence, assume liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which liability is hereby excluded. Consequently, such use is at the recipient’s own risk on the basis that any use by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this disclaimer. The recipient is obliged to inform any subsequent recipient of such terms.
This document may provide guidance supplemental to the requirements of local legislation. Nothing herein, however, is intended to replace, amend, supersede or otherwise depart from such requirements. In the event of any conflict or contradiction between the provisions of this document and local legislation, applicable laws shall prevail.
Husband: What can I do to hep make dinner?
Wife: Take this bag of potatoes, peel half of them, and put them in the pot.
I just went through the attendance list for the 2016 Global TapRooT® Summit and I was impressed. What a great bunch of people we are having come together in San Antonio!
For me, as President of System Improvements and one of the creators of the TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis System, the Summit always seems like old home week or a high school reunion. I get to see some of our clients that have been working hard to save lives, improve quality, and keep their companies from getting a black eye.
We’ve been doing these Summits since 1994 and you might not believe it but, I’ve been learning new and valuable stuff at the Summit every year.
So for all of you coming to the 2016 Global Summit,
I CAN’T WAIT TO SAY “HOWDY!”
And get caught up on what you have been doing to make the world a better place.
And for those who haven’t signed up yet,
What? You don’t know why you should attend? You need the knowledge shared at the Summit to …
SAVE YOUR COMPANY $$$
Those are business critical topics that you need to make your company best in class.
See the Summit brochure at:
See the Summit agenda at:
If you need more convincing, let me plead with you to attend. Watch this video…