Category: Documents

Safe Holiday Wish PowerPoint

December 2nd, 2010 by

I post several Holiday Safety PowerPoints that were given to me by TapRooT® Users. They are yours for toolbox holiday safety meetings.

Here is the first:

SafeHolidayWish-1.ppt

Monday Accident & Lessons Learned: Technical Investigation Report concerning the Fire on Eurotunnel Freight Shuttle 7412 on 11 September 2008

November 22nd, 2010 by

See the joint report by the French Bureau d’enquêtes sur les Accidents de transport terrestre and the UK Rail Accident Investigation Branch at:

http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/101122_ReportET2010_eurotunnel_eng.pdf

Taking Improvement to the Next Level

October 27th, 2010 by

You really need to be at this talk to hear what I have to say. This PowerPoint is for the attendees to remind them of what they heard…

Takingimprovementnextlevelprint2

Lessons Learned from Rickover About Process Safety/Nuclear Safety

October 22nd, 2010 by

Rickover’s ideas are still applicable and controversial today. Here’s the slides from the talk I’m giving at the Summit…

Rickoverprint2

Prioritizing Improvements

October 21st, 2010 by

Here’s the “kick off” slides from a discussion we will be having at the Summit…

Prioritizingimprovementsprint

Welcome to the TapRooT® Summit

October 21st, 2010 by

The Summit starts next Wednesday, but I’ll be posting some of the talks so that people attending the Sumnmit can print them to take notes and preview what they will hear.

Caution: A PowerPoint of a talk isn’t the same as a talk. I know in my talks, there are things that are said that make the slides “come alive.” Also, some of the bullets on the slides are “for discussion.” They aren’t meant as a final conclusion, but rather as a starting point. Therefore, these talks should be observed and participated in at the Summit rather than being read as a final statement.

here is the Summit intro talk that will be delivered by Mark Paradies, Linda Unger, Ed Skompski, Ken Reed, Chris Vallee, and David Janney.

Welcome10Print

UK Rail Accident Investigation Branch Publishes a Report on the Derailment at Dingwall, Scotland, 22 January 2010

September 30th, 2010 by

See:

http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Bulletin%20(Dingwall)%2011-2010.pdf

Blame Culture and Deepwater Horizon Accident

September 23rd, 2010 by

Safety & Health Practitioner (the official magazine of the Institute of Occupational Safety & Health) published an article titled: “Blame culture prominent on Transocean rigs“.

The first paragraph said:

A culture of fear and blame is rife across the operations of offshore drilling contractor Transocean, according to a leaked HSE inspection report.

Wow! That’s certainly an “explosive” claim. Especially with the weight of the UK Health and Safety Executive behind it.

For the complete story, see:

http://www.shponline.co.uk/news-content/full/blame-culture-prominent-on-transocean-rigs

Are 12 Hour Shifts Safe?

September 22nd, 2010 by

Teaching root cause analysis, I have lots of people ask me about 12 hours shifts, fatigue, and safety. If this is a question you are interested in, I have a free publication that might interest you …

 Landing 12Hrcover

It is written by the experts in fatigue and shift scheduling, Circadian Technologies. Get your copy at:

http://www.circadianinfo.com/landing/The_Advantages_Disadvantages_of_12_Hour_Shifts.htm

ANSI/API Fatigue Risk Management System Recommended Practice

September 7th, 2010 by

The American Petroleum Institute and the American National Standards Institute have published a recommended practice titled: Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Personnel in the Refining and Petrochemical Industries (ANSI/API Recommended Practice 775, First Edition, April 2010).

You can download the standard at this site:

http://www.api.org/Standards/new/api-rp-755.cfm

Now, what do incident investigators need to know about this standard when performing a root cause analysis? If you are at a refinery or petrochemical plant, you are required to consider fatigue when doing your investigation. The standard says:

4.7 Incident/Near Miss Investigation

The investigation of incidents should be conducted in a manner that facilitates the determination of the role, if any, of fatigue as a root cause or contributing cause to the incident. Information collected should include the time of the incident, the shift pattern, including the number of consecutive shifts worked, the number of hours awake, the number of hours of sleep in the past 24 hours by the individuals involved; the shift duration (and any overtime worked); whether the incident occured under normal operations or an extended shift; whether an outage was occurring; and, other fatigue factors. It should be noted that for individual incidents, often no definitive conclusion regarding the role of fatigue may be possible. However, aggregate analysis of incidents may reveal patterns suggestive of the role of fatigue that is not apparent by evaluating incidents individually.

When using TapRooT®, fatigue has always been considered as part of the “15 Questions” asked for every Human Performance Difficulty. The first question asks:

Was the person excessively fatigues, impaired, upset, distracted, or overwhelmed?

This question is expanded on in the Root Cause Tree® Dictionary. These questions were developed with the help of Circadian Technologies. We also worked with them to develop a free internet based fatigue evaluation tool called FACTS (Fatigue Accident/Incident Causation Testing System). You can try it for free at:

http://facts.circadian.com/facts/

Want to find out more about fatigue and FACTS? The attend the TapRooT® Summit. Rainer Gutkuhn (one of the designers of FACTS) will show attendees in the Behavior Change & Stopping Human Error Track how to use FACTS in an investigation.

That’s just one of the many great sessions at the Summit. See:

http://www.taproot.com/summit.php?t=schedule

for the complete Summit Schedule.

Process Safety and Operational Excellence Were Invented By Admiral Rickover

September 6th, 2010 by

Here’s an old document (1979 – in pdf format) where Admiral Rickover set out his tenets that assured reactor safety in the Nuclear Navy.

Rickeovercongressionaltestimony

We will be discussing his philosophy at the TapRooT® Summit in the “Lessons Learned About Excellence and Safety From Admiral Rickover” session in the Improvement Program Best Practices Track on Thursday from 10:40-12.

Don’t miss this session where where you can learn how Process Safety Management and Operational Excellence originated.

To register for the Summit, go to:

https://taproot.com/summit.php?t=register

And if your were a Navy Nuc … leave your comments here about your experience in the Nuclear navy and how it changed your approach to operations, maintenance, or life.

Safety Culture Components

August 29th, 2010 by

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has developed 13 safety culture components that were updated and released earlier this year. They are:

  1. Decision-making
  2. Resources
  3. Work Control
  4. Work Practices
  5. Corrective action program
  6. Operating experience
  7. Self and independent assessments
  8. Environment for raising safety concerns
  9. Preventing, detecting, and mitigating perceptions of retaliation
  10. Accountability
  11. Continuous learning environment
  12. Organizational change management
  13. Safety policies

To read more about these safety culture components, see this NRC document:

Safetyculture13Components

I’ve Never Seen a Letter Like This … Have You?

August 26th, 2010 by

Rafael Moure-Eraso, Chairman of the Chemical Safety Board, sent the letter below to Xcel Energy Inc., a utility with its headquarters in Minnesota. I’ve never seen a letter written so strongly from an investigator about the lack of cooperation about an investigation. Have you?

It would certainly be interesting to know more about what happened to cause the lack of cooperation.

Here’s link to the letter:

http://www.csb.gov/assets/document/Final_Report1.pdf?idevd=3273EF46CAE811DD8ECCD75256D89593&idevm=bb375e8ce1d04f54abde8a9e91d09b4d&idevmid=381306

Here’s a pdf of the letter:

Csbletter

Monday Accident & Lessons Learned: UK Rail Accident Investigation Branch Publishes Bulletin About a Train Collision with a Level Crossing Gate

July 26th, 2010 by

The UK RAIB’s report had three “Learning Points”:

1. Repeated occurrences of the same or closely related faults are likely to be a symptom of an underlying problem. Systems should be in place to identify repeated faults and to implement effective remedial action.

2. Maintenance requirements, particularly those applying to equipment connected with safety (such as the maintenance of gate stops (paragraph 13)), should not be left to local interpretation but should be determined by a competent person and recorded in a maintenance document.

3. It is important that signallers and crossing keepers at crossings of this type are given an unobstructed view of the gates, where it is practicable to do so.

To read the whole article, see:

http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Bulletin%20(Stow%20Park)%2010-2010.pdf

Here’s a PDF of Robert Bea’s Preliminary Findings About the BP/Transocean Deepwater Horizon Accident

July 6th, 2010 by

Click the document below to open…

Bobbeapreliminaryanalyses

My evaluation of the preliminary findings is that they are at the level of the causal factors. Still more work to be done to get to root causes.

BP Deepwater Horizon Fault Tree

July 1st, 2010 by

A TapRooT® Instructor forwarded this to me. What do you think? Does this add to your knowledge of the accident?

Bpfaulttree

BP Investigation Presentation from the Deepwater Horizon Accident

July 1st, 2010 by

Here’s a PDF of the preliminary BP Investigation downloaded from the House of Representatives Energy and Commerce web site:

Bpinvestigationpresentation2

Review the slides and see what you think.

Compare their four “critical factors” to the multiple Causal Factors at these two links:

http://www.taproot.com/content/2010/06/11/great-letter-to-the-editor-in-the-wall-street-journal-lays-out-causal-factors-immediately-before-the-well-blowout/

http://www.taproot.com/content/2010/06/17/well-design-construction-causal-factors-of-the-deepwater-horizon-accident/

What are they missing if they don’t look at additional Causal Factors?

Anything else that you see about this investigation presentation that makes it easy or hard to understand?

Please leave your comments.

Corporate Homicide – Death in the Workplace

June 24th, 2010 by

When the unthinkable happens will you be ready?

Cmflyer

Open the PDF and see what you can learn before the Summit.

Here’s the link to register for the course:

http://www.taproot.com/courses.php?d=25

Well Design & Construction Causal Factors of the Deepwater Horizon Accident

June 17th, 2010 by

In an earlier posting, we laid out the Causal Factors immediately before the well blowout as described by Terry Barr.

Now someone else has helped us identify the Causal Factors associated with the well design and construction. The Committee on Energy and Commerce investigation into the well blowout has identified 5 Causal Factors in a letter to Tony Hayward dated June 14, 2010. That letter is also covered in a Wall Street Journal article.

I’ll summarize the Causal Factors here and let you read the details in the letter liked to above.

Well Design and Construction Causal Factors

  1. Choice of the cheaper, but less safe, well completion liner option to complete the well.
  2. Using to few casing centralizers for the well design.
  3. Failure to perform a cement bond log.
  4. Failure to circulate the mud prior to cementing per the API standard.
  5. Failure to deploy the casing hanger lockdown sleeve prior to replacing the mud with seawater.

That makes a total of 12 Causal Factors for the incident BEFORE the blowout preventer failed.

The blowout preventer failure will have one or more Causal Factors and the failures to contain and cleanup the spill and minimize environmental damage will have multiple Causal Factors. Of course, the multiple number of failures is “normal” in an accident of this significance. And when all these Causal Factors are analyzed for their root causes, there will be a significant number of ways that BP, and perhaps the industry, can learn from this accident and improve performance so that we don’t have to kill 11 workers and cause an environmental nightmare ever again.

One last note … All the Causal Factors mentioned here are based on publicly available information. We haven’t done any interviews or collected any first-hand information. It would be nice to see a fully qualified investigative team use advanced tools to perform a real root cause analysis on the first-hand data.

Also, I have posted the Congressional Letter below to make sure that it is available to those reviewing this article in the future…

Lettertohayward614

Mark’s Talk About the Heinrich Pyramid (Safety Pyramid) at the European Safety Committee of the Conference Board

June 1st, 2010 by

That’s me and the interested participants at the Conference Board…

P1020056.JPG

Below is a copy of a PDF of the PowerPoint that I used.

ConfBoardPrint2.pdf

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