FACTS is an online diagnostic expert system to help investigators and companies readily determine if human fatigue may have been a causal factor in an accident/incident.
ABOUT CIRCADIAN®
CIRCADIAN® provides Fatigue Risk Management Systems, Shift Schedules, Software, and Training & Publications to solve the challenges of the 24/7 workforce.
FACTS is a web-based investigatory tool that helps users determine if human fatigue may have been a causal factor in an accident/incident. Developed by the world’s leading experts in sleep, fatigue, and circadian rhythms, FACTS generates results that correlate well (r = .91) with conclusions reached by experts who investigated NTSB and other industrial accidents.
Fatigue is one of the most pervasive yet under-reported causes of human error-related accidents, incidents, and injuries in both the industrial and transportation sectors.
Because fatigue is difficult to detect (i.e., no blood, urine or breathalyzer test exists to identify it) companies have a difficult time quantifying the true impact and cost of fatigue in their operations.
To bridge this gap, CIRCADIAN® created an online diagnostic expert system to help investigators and companies readily determine (by standardizing criteria and with high probability) if human fatigue may have been a causal factor in an accident/incident.
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One additional note …
One of the developers of FACT will be at the TapRooT® Summit to share information about the technique and how to use it.
This presentation is in the Changing Behavior and Stopping Human Error track from 10:40-12 on Thursday, October 28.
Of course, major accidents have bad outcomes. Now, many CEO’s should feel less secure after the recent BP Deepwater Horizon accident outcomes.
What and I talking about? Tony Hayward is “Standing Down” and accepting retirement after his leadership was questioned (see the BBC report at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-10434908).
Previous BP CEO, Lord Browne, also “stood down” after the BP Texas City accident and a lawsuit over court testimony (personal in nature and not related to his BP work).
There are heated debates in many quarters about the criminal and personal liability that CEO’s should have for accidents at their companies, these developments should make CEO’s think about the risks that their employees face and their efforts to improve safety and environmental performance.
We already know that the BP Deepwater Horizon and BP Texas City accidents were preventable. We already know how to set up a world class performance improvement program. We already know how to apply advanced root cause analysis to analyze small problems and prevent big ones.
A CEO should make sure that his/her company is applying these improvement techniques and stopping major accidents before they happen.
What if they don’t?
They risk following in the footsteps of Lord Browne and Tony Hayward.
German prosecutors are investigating the causes of a crowd control failure that lead to the deaths of 19 at the Love Parade techno music festival in Duisburg, Germany.
A Canadian Health Unit report said that a doctor’s cataracts are partly to blame for incorrect pathology reports that led to an unnecessary colostomy, two mastectomies, and at least four other cases of “serious concern.”
The story was reported by healthzone.ca. See the whole story at:
..”About one-fourth of the problems were things like infections and eye abrasions in contact lens wearers. These are sometimes preventable and can result from wearing contact lenses too long without cleaning them.”
..”Other common problems found by researchers at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration include puncture wounds from hypodermic needles breaking off in the skin while injecting medicine or illegal drugs; infections in young children with ear tubes; and skin tears from pelvic devices used during gynecological exams in teen girls.”
..”The most serious problems involved implanted devices such as brain shunts for kids with hydrocephalus (water on the brain); chest catheters for cancer patients receiving chemotherapy at home; and insulin pumps for diabetics. Infections and overdoses are among problems associated with these devices. Only 6 percent of patients overall had to be hospitalized.”
…”Malfunction and misuse are among possible reasons”
I read the article and then asked “AND”? There is so much more information that needs to be collected and compared.
… “is there damage with this equipment for children and adults?”
… “is there a difference between different manufacturers for the same types of equipment?”
…”what allowed 70,000 incidents to occur without having the root causes listed already?” …. yes I know there are patient and company privacy issues but that is not a good excuse!
The UK RAIB’s report had three “Learning Points”:
1. Repeated occurrences of the same or closely related faults are likely to be a symptom of an underlying problem. Systems should be in place to identify repeated faults and to implement effective remedial action.
2. Maintenance requirements, particularly those applying to equipment connected with safety (such as the maintenance of gate stops (paragraph 13)), should not be left to local interpretation but should be determined by a competent person and recorded in a maintenance document.
3. It is important that signallers and crossing keepers at crossings of this type are given an unobstructed view of the gates, where it is practicable to do so.
“Hayward’s departure could be formally announced within 24 hours, the BBC reports today, adding that his U.S. colleague Bob Dudley — now in charge of the spill’s cleanup — will likely be his successor.”
Major accidents ruin careers. Now is the time to apply advanced root cause analysis to stop major accidents by learning all that you can from incidents and near-misses. Send your investigators to TapRooT® Training.
One more idea … Make sure you have folks at the TapRooT® Summit. Share best practices to improve performance and prevent accidents. See:
The New York Times wrote an article titled “Workers on Doomed Rig Voiced Concern About Safety” that questioned the maintenance practices of Transocean aboard the Deepwater Horizon. Quotes from the article include:
“Some workers also voiced concerns about poor equipment reliability, ‘which they believed was as a result of drilling priorities taking precedence over planned maintenance,’ according to the survey.”
“’I’m petrified of dropping anything from heights not because I’m afraid of hurting anyone (the area is barriered off), but because I’m afraid of getting fired,’ one worker wrote.”
““The company is always using fear tactics,” another worker said. ‘All these games and your mind gets tired.‘”
“The two Transocean-commissioned reports obtained by The Times echo the findings of a maintenance audit conducted by BP in September 2009. But the Transocean-commissioned reports indicate that maintenance concerns existed just days before the explosion and the rig owner was aware of them. The 2009 BP audit found that Transocean had left 390 maintenance jobs undone, requiring more than 3,500 hours of work. The BP audit also referred to the amount of deferred work as ‘excessive.‘”
Washington DC, July 21, 2010 – A U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) case study released today on the 2009 explosion and fire at the Veolia ES Technical Solutions L.L.C. facility in West Carrollton, Ohio, calls on the industry to improve safety standards covering hazardous waste processing, handling, and storage facilities. The Board also recommended that fire protection codes be revised to require companies to determine safe distances between occupied buildings and potentially hazardous operating areas.
The accident occurred on May 4, 2009, when flammable vapor was released from a waste recycling process, ignited, and violently exploded. The blast seriously injured two workers and damaged 20 nearby residences and five businesses. CSB investigators found that the north wall of the lab and operations building – where the victims were injured – was less than 30 feet from the waste recycling processing area where the flammable vapor was released.
CSB Chairman Rafael Moure-Eraso said, “This accident should not have happened. Our report notes that OSHA cited the company for inadequate attention to process safety management practices in the handling of flammable liquids. But in case of an accident, I believe it is absolutely critical that buildings at chemical facilities be sited safe distances from process equipment to maximize the safety of workers. We are making recommendations that would help ensure that operating areas with occupied buildings such as control rooms be sufficiently separated from process areas containing flammable liquids and gases that have the potential to explode.”
The Board issued a recommendation to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which develops codes and standards for industry, urging NFPA to require companies to perform engineering analyses to determine safe separation distances between buildings occupied by administrative and other personnel not essential to process operations, and buildings housing the potentially hazardous process equipment.
The Board also revised a previous recommendation to the Environmental Technology Council, a hazardous waste industry trade group, to petition the NFPA to develop a standard specific to hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This would include guidance on reducing the likelihood of fires, explosions, and releases of hazardous waste.
Dr. Moure noted, “The Environmental Technology Council did not respond adequately to our 2007 recommendation, which we issued following an explosion and massive fire at the Environmental Quality hazardous waste facility in Apex, North Carolina, to work for more stringent standards in the hazardous waste industry. I strongly urge the industry to act now. These facilities, by their nature, contain wide varieties of flammable and toxic materials that can cause significant injury to workers and threaten the well being of nearby communities. Facility owners and operators need stricter technical requirements to improve the safety of life and property.”
The report notes that after a normal run of the tetrahydrafuran (THF) solvent recovery process at the Veolia facility, the unit operator began a routine shutdown. Completing the process required blowing nitrogen back through the circulation piping to clean it, prior to closing valves.
CSB lead investigator Johnnie Banks said, “At the time of the shutdown, witnesses reported hearing the sound of a sudden, loud vapor release and smelling a very strong odor of THF solvent which knocked several employees to their knees. It was a matter of just a couple of minutes until the highly flammable vapor ignited.”
The vapor drifted to the laboratory and operations building and found an ignition source inside the building. A worker in the control room reported being enveloped in a fireball that went through the building. The first explosion knocked over a bank of lockers, severely injuring an employee and pinning him underneath.
Because of the extensive fire damage, the CSB was unable to conclusively determine the exact initiating event for the vapor release, concluding one of two possible scenarios likely occurred. In the first scenario, air may have been drawn into a tank containing THF residue and peroxides, causing increased pressure in the tank and forcing flammable vapor from the tank to escape through a manway cover or a vacuum breaker.
In the second possible scenario, CSB investigators believe a line hose, intended to send pressurized nitrogen into a different tank, may have instead been connected to a tank containing unprocessed, flammable liquid. When the nitrogen was applied, it forced flammable vapor out through the tank vent. In either scenario, the vapor drifted to the operations building and ignited, causing the injuries.
In addition to issuing recommendations to NFPA and the hazardous waste industry, the Board also issued recommendations to Veolia, which is rebuilding the plant. The CSB called on the company to restrict occupancy in buildings in close proximity to the operating plant to personnel trained in the safe operation and orderly shutdown of the plant. The Board also called on the Center for Chemical Process Safety, a division of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, to revise control room siting guidelines to address the characteristics of all Class 1B flammable liquids.
For more information, contact Public Affairs Specialist Hillary Cohen, 202-261-3601, or Sandy Gilmour, 202-261-7614, cell 202-251-5496
Every once in a while, investigators discover something unexpected. This seems to be the case in the Massy Energy Company mine explosion in West Virginia.
Early investigation guesses focussed on Massey’s history of safety violations. This new information may show that past safety violations had nothing to do with this accident.
I would give you a direct link but the Times of London is by subscription only.
Quotes from the Times of London story include:
“‘You would be hard-pushed to find anyone within the company who does not think he is irreparably damaged – both by his own performance and by the event itself,’ a company insider was quoted as telling the paper.”
The story says that this is part of a strategy called “Future BP” and his resignation should come within 10 weeks.
BP has denied that Mr. Hayward is resigning ever since the rumors started back in June and a BP spokesperson said today that Mr. Hayward has the “… full support from the board and will remain in place.”
Interesting internal politics after a major accident.
One of the biggest trends in quality improvement was the term “The Cost of Poor Quality” tied with “Zero Defects”, with many COPQ financial models popping up in many Fortune 500 companies. In the safety world there was a similar drive with the term Cost of Compensation tied with “Zero Injuries” and OSHA driven recordables to be tracked.
The Quality Iceberg
The Safety Iceberg
Yet the focus for both safety and quality were lead by lagging visible indicators. In other words good or bad, the findings are just too late. You march your troops with the “Zero Defects” and “Zero Injuries” flags raised and once you reach your destination you turn around and see who and what equipment you have left.
Now don’t get me wrong, identifying and being able to comprehend the end damage is a vital part of the process and unfortunately not realized by some. It is just NOT where you should focus your drive and effort.
So what now you may ask? “Build quality in… do not inspect quality in!”
The phrase above often goes to deaf ears because it is misunderstand. “If you do not assess the quality of your work, then how do you know if it is to standards,” people would ask. “I have to trust everybody’s work?” In the safety world the phrase “Safety must be part of every action we do,” is often trumpeted. But how?!
Start with these 3 steps first:
1. First things first, Quality and Safety are NOT silo’s and they should work together. Setting up a task that can be worked efficiently, correctly and safely by employees is a combined goal and SHOULD NOT be competing goals.
To save money, many companies do not cross-train employee’s from different departments. Why not if it makes sense? For example, while many of our clients started using TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis in their safety departments first, the more people saw the process used, the more operations and facilities come onboard for the same training.
Now this cross-training concept also works in the opposite direction. As the quality department leaders started working with the safety, quality tools from Stakeholder Analysis to Force Field Analysis were also shared with the safety department. After all, inside all world class companies are different departments that are all part of the same company with one goal.
2. Building Quality and Safety into a process starts in the beginning stages of planning but can be recovered after the employees try to use an existing process (it just costs more time and money!).
When our clients use our Root Cause Analysis process to investigate defects and incidents it soon becomes apparent that the opposite of each one of our root causes are best practices that can be implemented proactively.
While most Quality Experts are excellent at mapping out front end value streams, process maps and spaghetti maps, there is often a gap in knowledge of research and industry best practices in human engineering, communication, procedures, training and work direction. So if you were a Quality Professional and had access to multiple experts in front of you everyday, would you utilize them? Here is small list of courses that can give you best practice access: Best Practice Courses
3. No process, no matter how well designed is perpetually stable and it must be audited/assessed periodically based on risk for unknown and known changes…. note: this is not the same thing as “inspecting in quality”!
This is one of the most misunderstood ingredients relating to Inspections.
If you have a hold point inspection that must be completed by an Independent Inspector BEFORE a task can be completed or a part received or shipped, you are admitting that you have a high risk potential that is not capable of being completely mistake proofed.
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You have a process or task where you have not truly identified the human and equipment behaviors with their associated Root Causes, and have decided that it is worth spending the extra money and time to inspect instead of fixing the problem. You refuse to build in quality.
Now this is not saying that you should not target high risk tasks proactively and continually audit or assess these areas to ensure nothing has changed or is different. This type of inspection must still occur.
“China rushed to keep an oil spill from reaching international waters Tuesday, while an environmental group tried to assess if the country’s largest reported spill was worse than has been disclosed.
Crude oil started pouring into the Yellow Sea off a busy northeastern port after a pipeline exploded late last week, sparking a massive 15-hour fire. The government says the slick has spread across a 70-square-mile (180-square-kilometer) stretch of ocean.”
The Wall Street Journal article discusses twenty “anomalies” signaled that a blowout could be coming and unexpected pressure increase triggered disagreements between BP and Transocean employees. See:
Today was the day that BP Well-Site Manager Don Vidrine was suppose to testify. However, he was removed from the list of witnesses. Later this week the other Well-Site Manager, Robert Kaluza, is scheduled to testify. Previously, he “took the fifth” (self incrimination) and declined to testify.
These hearings, although probably the worst way to interview witnesses, are still extremely interesting.
SAFETY ALERT NO. 225: PIPE HANDLING OPERATIONS RESULT IN FATALITY
Country: USA
Location: OFFSHORE : Other offshore
Type of Activity: Lifting, Crane, Rigging, Deck operations
Type of Injury: Caught In, Under or Between
Function: Drilling
Applicabale Filter Categories: Caught between
Recently a fatality occurred during pipe handling operations on a deepwater drilling unit. A rig employee’s head was caught between the pipe handler’s lower travel assembly and a vertical support stanchion (pinch/crush point of 4 inches) as the pipe handler was being traversed across the pipe bay to the catwalk to retrieve a joint of pipe. The deceased was acting as a spotter for the pipe handler operator at the time of the incident and the pipe handler operator did not observe the incident due to his obstructed view of the spotter.
What Went Wrong?:
The BOEM (formerly MMS) investigation revealed that unidentified crush points existed between the lower travel assembly and the vertical support stanchions of the trolley system. It was concluded in part, from the investigation that the pipe handler operator failed to confirm an “all clear” with the spotter and failed to exercise his Stop Work authority when he lost site of the spotter. The Lessee/Operator failed to provide the necessary additional oversight to ensure that the pipe handler operation was conducted in accordance with their lifting policy. The drilling company’s line management also failed to:
Provide a more formalized training program to include the hazards associated with the operation of the pipe handler.
Identify the specific pipe handler operational tasks, hazards and respective mitigations in order to develop and implement guidelines for personnel working around the strong-back area.
Provide additional onsite supervision to both the Operator and Spotter during the pipe handler operation.
Properly implement their Management of Change policy with respect to new personnel in new positions. The company’s Management of Change policy was also identified as being too complex to implement.
Corrective actions and Recommendations:
Therefore, BOEM recommends the following to Lessees/Operators and their Drilling Contractors for any type of overhead trolley beam mounted crane (trolley crane) operation, including but not limited to a pipe handler:
Inspect trolley crane operations with the intent to identify all potential hazards and mitigations (including pinch/crush points), and communicate these findings with all necessary personnel.
Review Stop Work authority programs with their personnel, while stressing the importance of the individual’s responsibilities and authority to exercise Stop Work as necessary.
Review trolley crane training programs to ensure that the program covers not only the proper operation of the equipment, but also includes the limitations, capabilities and potential hazards. If the training includes onsite hands-on training, the verification/certification should be done by senior facility management.
Review the Management of Change policy for clarity and to ensure the program recognizes and manages changes, conditions and inactions in a given situation or unexpected events.
Install and maintain safety barriers (signage, red zones, tiger striping, temporary barrier tape, handrails, etc.) to prevent access to the trolley crane’s traversing path.
Clear the trolley crane’s path of general storage. Telephone, intercoms or stored items located under the trolley crane should be removed and relocated to a safer area.
Consider the feasibility of installing cameras or mirrors in areas where the trolley crane operator’s view is obstructed.
Consider the feasibility of re-engineering the trolley crane to possibly eliminate any additional Spotter involvement.
Conduct pre-tour meetings for all tours, including short change crews. The short change crew involves multiple employees filling new roles and/or not working on their normal crew shift.
Witness lists of fact-finding joint investigation available for July 19-23, 2010
NEW ORLEANS – The following are links to witness lists for July 19-23, 2010 for the third round of public hearings in this fact-finding joint investigation. The purpose of this joint investigation is to develop conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the Deepwater Horizon MODU explosion and loss of life on April 20, 2010. The facts collected at this hearing, along with the lead investigators’ conclusions and recommendations will be forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters and BMOE for approval. Once approved, the final investigative report will be made available to the public and the media. No analysis or conclusions will be presented during the hearing.
Click on the dates to link to individual witness lists:
The Associated Press reported that an explosion of a coke oven at a plant in Pittsburg injured 20 people, at least six critically. The explosion happened during maintenance on the B “battery” (bank) of the ovens.
The worry now is that pressure will build and rupture the well casing. This could make future efforts to use relief wells to finally permanently stop the flow more difficult or impossible. But government scientist approved this latest effort.
On June 16th, we published a blog article about the qualifications of the President’s Independent Commission to investigate the BP Deepwater Horizon accident. Many of the readers here commented on the qualifications and the overall response was that they didn’t seem particularly well qualified to find the root causes of the well blowout, explosion, and spill. See the comments here:
Last week, the Wall Street Journal published an article, “The White House Get’s Drilled,” that pointed out the bias of the Commission. It said:
“By contrast, the President’s seven-member commission contains not a single expert on drilling or petroleum engineering and is instead loaded with such anti-oil and antidrilling activists as Natural Resources Defense Council President Frances Beinecke and former Florida Senator Bob Graham.”
The also quoted Louisianna Democratic Senator Mary Landrieu, who said:
“I would suggest to my Democratic friends that if the shoe were on the other foot, and President Bush was the President and he had submitted a list of names like this to us and everyone was related to the defense of oil companies, we would say this is not fair.”
In reviewing the commissions qualifications, the Journal article points out the following:
About Commissioner Reilly: “Mr. Reilly is well known as a green activist who once ran the World Wildlife Fund, which is precisely what made him attractive as a GOP political appointee and for ConocoPhillips. Both were looking for environmental cover.”
About Commissioner Beinecke: “‘Offshore drilling is a needless risk,’ said Ms. Beinecke in 2008, as part of her push for cap-and-trade legislation.”
About Commissioner Boesch: “‘We should be redoubling our efforts to get off oil,’ said fellow commission member Donald Boesch in May. He wants ‘transportation not powered by liquid petroleum.’”
About Commissioner Garcia: “Appointee Terry Garcia of the National Geographic Society rapped the Bush administration in 2008 for not doing more to ‘protect’ oceans from ‘commercial and recreational fishing, oil and gas exploration or deep-sea mining.’”
About Commissioner Murray: “Harvard’s Cherry Murray is president of the American Physical Society that recently rejected calls from 160 physicists to alter its doomsday position on climate change, which demands immediate reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions to avoid ’significant disruptions in the Earth’s physical and ecological systems, social systems, security and human health.’”
About Commissioner Ulmer: “The University of Alaska’s Fran Ulmer is on the board of the Union of Concerned Scientists, which wants the U.S. to curb its ‘oil addiction’ by requiring that cars get at least 42 miles to the gallon.”
The article goes on to comment of the Commission’s new Executive Director, Richard Lazarus. The article says:
“Underscoring its biases, the President’s commission has chosen prominent environmental litigator Richard J. Lazarus as its staff director. Mr. Lazarus has made a career out of suing private companies and governments to impose stricter environmental regulation.”
This week, the Commission’s Executive Director wrote back to the Wall Street Journal. In an editorial, published today, he said:
“The commission is co-chaired by two highly regarded public servants, former Sen. Bob Graham and former EPA Administrator Bill Reilly. They are individuals of enormous integrity and highly respected by industry, by members of Congress and by state officials, regardless of formal political affiliation.”
He also said:
“You may also note that the commission recently named Richard Sears, a widely respected oil industry expert with 35 years experience, as its adviser on science and engineering, to augment the oil industry expertise of Mr. Reilly, who has served on the Conoco-Phillips board for over 15 years.”
So, I thought I would look for Bio’s of Mr. Lazarus and Mr. Sears. Here’s what I found…
“Richard Sears is Vice President and Extra-mural Research Coordinator for Shell International Exploration and Production Inc. He is currently on loan to MIT for a period of three years, where he serves as Visiting Scientist in the Laboratory for Energy and the Environment. The intent is to create a research and technology relationship model for Shell with major US universities and manage Shell energy research activities at MIT as well as other research relationships in the Americas.”
“In his more than 30 years with Shell, Richard has gained significant domestic and international experience, frequently representing Shell to partners, governments and national oil companies, including presentations to governmental authorities and ministers of eleven countries. He has been an invited and keynote speaker at industry conferences in the US, UK, Africa and Asia.
Prior to his current assignment, he shared responsibility for developing Shell strategy for deepwater exploration and development worldwide and was one of three vice presidents within Shell E&P responsible for the work of over 800 technical professionals across the globe from over 15 distinct geoscience, engineering and business disciplines.”
“Previous positions within Shell have included exploration geophysicist, technical instructor, economist, strategic planner, and general management.”
“He is the author of numerous internal publications including field studies and case histories, geophysical research reports, and technical training manuals.”
“Richard has been a member of the Stanford University School of Earth Sciences Advisory Board since 2004. He is a Licensed Professional Geoscientist in the State of Texas, an active member of the Society of Exploration Geophysicists and a member of the American Association of Physics Teachers.”
“He earned his Master of Science degree in Geophysics and his Bachelor of Science degree in physics from Stanford University.”
To me, he seems well qualified. But I wish I knew more about his oil drilling (not just oil exploration geophysical) experience and his experience leading accident investigations.
With that said, what influence does a consultant to the Commission have? He isn’t a commission member. I guess his influence is yet to be seen.
What do you think?
Does a well qualified consultant change your opinion on the qualifications of the President’s Independent Commission to investigate the BP Deepwater Horizon accident? Let me know by posting your comments here.
The Houston Chronicle reports that Anadarko Petroleum is withholding payment on a bill sent by BP to help pay for the spill.
The article says:
“The company has argued that it’s not responsible for costs arising from an operating partner’s ‘negligence’ or ‘willfull misconduct’ — something it accuses BP of in relation to the spill.”
The article also said:
“Last month, Anadarko CEO James Hackett said BP should shoulder the costs of the spill. BP has said it strongly disagreed with Anadarko’s allegations.”
“As the worst accident in the Kwakwani area, resulting in deaths, critical injuries and traumatized workers, it cannot be swept under the carpet as a simple road accident. While the Union is encouraged at the efforts made to save lives, it will not be satisfied to be told that this is as far as it goes. We need a root cause analysis to determine all factors contributing to this very sad loss of lives and injury and immediate short and long term measures to be implemented so that such situations of hazards are removed or minimized in the daily lives of bauxite workers.”
“Meanwhile, company officials continued hammering home the message on costs. Mr. Shaw, the Gulf of Mexico head, made the point at a meeting for top managers in Phoenix in April 2008. His aim, according to an internal BP communication, was to instill a ‘much stronger performance culture’ in the organization, based on strictly managing costs and ‘this notion that every dollar does matter.’”
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“A former BP engineer who retired last year said the Gulf of Mexico operation under Mr. Shaw became focused on meeting performance targets, which determined bonuses for top managers and low-level workers alike. The engineer says even small costs got targeted: BP no longer provided food at lunch meetings, and eliminated the fruit bowls that were offered as part of a healthy-living drive a few years earlier.”
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Talking about pipeline leaks in Alaska … “The state [Alaska] also said it was ‘deeply concerned with the timeliness and depth of the incident investigation’ conducted by BP. It took four months to provide a report that other oil companies typically submit in two weeks.”
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“Some think the cost drive affected safety. Workers had ‘high incentive to find shortcuts and take risks,’ says Ross Macfarlane, a former BP health and safety manager on rigs in Australia who was laid off in 2008. ‘You only ever got questioned about why you couldn’t spend less—never more.’ BP vigorously denies putting savings ahead of safety.”
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“In a different context, BP had questioned the impact of its cost-cutting in the Gulf. After the 2008 incident on the Atlantis platform, BP’s internal report warned of lax safety oversight and tight budgets.”
“It concluded: ‘A key question to ask, especially with apparently minor and disconnected defects, is ‘What’s the worst thing that could happen?””
