Category: Human Performance

Why do people jump to conclusions?

October 10th, 2017 by

I see examples of people jumping to conclusions all the time. Instead of taking the time to analyze a problem, they suggest their favorite corrective action.

Why do they do this? I think it is because thinking is so hard. As Henry Ford said:

“Thinking is the hardest work there is, which is probably the reason why so few engage in it.”

Did you know that when you think hard, your brain burns more calories? After a day of hard thinking you may feel physically exhausted.

Neuroscientific research at Cal Tech has shown that the more uncertainty there is in a problem (a cause and effect relationship), the more likely a person is to use “one-shot” learning (jumping to conclusions). This simplification saves us lots of work.

What’s the problem with jumping to conclusions?

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And even more important than saving effort in the analysis is that if you jump to a conclusion, you get to recommend the corrective action that you wanted to implement all along. Skip all that hard work of proving what the cause was and the details of developing effective fixes. Just do what you wanted to do before the problem ever happened!

The next time you are tempted to jump to a conclusion … THINK!

Yes, real root cause analysis and developing effective fixes is harder than just implementing the fix that you have been wanting to try even before the accident, but getting to the root (or roots) of the problem and really improving performance is worth the hard work of thinking.

Why is Root Cause Analysis Applied Reactively More Than Proactively?

October 3rd, 2017 by

I attended an interesting talk on the brain yesterday and had a different perspective on why so many managers are reactive rather than being proactive.

What do I mean by that? Managers wait to start improvement efforts until after something BAD happens rather than using a constant improvement effort to avoid accidents before they happen.

What about “human nature” (or the brain or neuropsychology) makes us that way? It has to do with the strongest human motivators.

Dr. Christophe  Morin said that research shows that the most recognizable human emotions expressed in facial expressions are:

  • Fear
  • Sadness
  • Disgust
  • Anger
  • Surprise
  • Trust
  • Joy
  • Anticipation

What draws our attention the most? Fear and Anger.

It seems that fear and ager catch our eye because they could indicate danger. And avoiding danger is what our primitive brain (or reptilian brain) is wired to do. Before we have any conscious thought, we decide if we need to run or fight (the fight or flight reaction).

What does this have to do with root cause analysis and reactive and proactive improvement?

What happens after an accident? FEAR!

Fear of being fired if you did the wrong thing.

Fear of looking bad to your peers.

Fear of lower management getting a bad review from upper management if your people look bad.

And even fear of consequences (lower earnings and lower stock price and a reaction from the board) for upper management if the accident is bad enough and gets national press coverage.

Even senior managers may get fired after a particularly disastrous accident.

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So fear drives behavior in many cases.

Management is much more likely to spend valuable resources when they are afraid (after an accident) than before the accident when the fear is much less and the promise of improvement through proactive improvement may bring joy or the anticipation of success.

Thus, management focuses on root cause analysis for accidents and incidents rather than applying it to assessments, audits, and peer reviews.

Can your management overcome human nature and apply root cause analysis before an accident happens or do they have to wait for a disaster to learn? That may be the difference between great leaders and managers waiting to be fired.

Don’t wait. Start applying advanced root cause analysis – TapRooT® – today to prevent future accidents.

Attend one of our public 5-Day TapRooT® Advanced Root Cause Team Leader Courses to learn how to apply TapRooT® reactively and proactively.

Generic Cause Analysis of the Navy’s Ship Collision/Grounding Problems

September 26th, 2017 by

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First, let me state that the reason I seem to be carried away by the failures of the Navy to implement good root cause analysis is that I spent seven years in the Navy and have compassion for the officers and sailors that are being asked to do so much. Our sailors and officers at sea are being asked to do more than we should ask them to do. The recent fatalities are proof of this and are completely avoidable. The Navy’s response so far has been inadequate at best.

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What should the Navy being doing? A thorough, advanced root cause analysis and generic cause analysis of the collisions and grounding in the 7th Fleet. And if you know me, you know that I think they should be using TapRooT® to do this.

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In TapRooT®, once you complete the analysis of the specific causes of a particular accident/incident, the next step is to identify the Generic Causes of the problems that caused that particular incident. Generic Causes are:

Generic Cause

The systemic cause that allows a root cause to exist.
Fixing the Generic Cause eliminates whole classes of specific root causes.

The normal process for finding generic causes is to look at each specific root cause that you have identified using the Root Cause Tree® and see if there is a generic causes using a three step process. The three steps are:

  1. Review the “Ideas for Generic Problems” section of the Corrective Action Helper® Guide for the root causes you have identified.
  2. Ask: “Does the same problem exist in more places?
  3. Ask: “What in the system is causing this Generic Cause to exist?”

It is helpful to have a database of thoroughly investigated previous problems when answering these question.

TapRooT® Users know about the Root Cause Tree® and the Corrective Action Helper® Guide and how to use them to perform advanced root cause analysis and develop effective corrective actions. If you haven’t been trained to use the TapRooT® System, I would recommend attending the 5-Day Advanced TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis Team Leader Training or reading the TapRooT® Essentials & Major Investigations Books.

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Unfortunately, we don’t have all the data from the recent and perhaps still incomplete Navy investigations to perform a TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis. What do we have? The press releases and news coverage of the accidents. From that information we can get a hint at the generic causes for these accidents.

Before I list the generic causes we are guessing at and discuss potential fixes, here is a disclaimer. BEFORE I would guarantee that these generic causes are accurate and that these corrective actions would be effective, I would need to perform an in-depth investigation and root cause analysis of the recent accidents and then determine the generic causes. Since that is not possible (the Navy is not a TapRooT® User), the following is just a guess based on my experience…

GENERIC CAUSES

1. INADEQUATE NUMBER OF SHIPS FOR THE USA FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS

2. INADEQUATE STAFFING OF THE SHIPS WE HAVE

3. INADEQUATE TRAINING OF THE CREWS OF THE SHIPS WE HAVE

4. INADEQUATE WATCH SCHEDULES AND PRIORITIZATION OF TASKS FOR UNDERWAY REQUIREMENTS

5. INAEQUATE CREW TEAMWORK AND CREW TEAMWORK TRAINING

Some of these problems should be fairly easy to fix in six months to two years. Others will be difficult to fix and may take a decade if there is the will to invest in a capable fleet. All of the problems must be fixed to significantly reduce the risk of these types of accidents in the future. Without fixes, the blood of sailors killed in future collisions will be on the hands of current naval leadership.

POTENTIAL FIXES

5. INAEQUATE CREW TEAMWORK AND CREW TEAMWORK TRAINING

  • Establish a crew teamwork training class oriented toward surface ship bridge watch operations that can be accomplished while ships are in port.
  • Conduct the training for all ships on a prioritized basis.
  • Integrate the training into junior officer training courses and department head and perspective XO and CO training.
  • Conduct underway audits to verify the effectiveness of the training, perhaps during shipboard refresher training and/or by type command staffs.

4. INADEQUATE WATCH SCHEDULES AND PRIORITIZATION OF TASKS FOR UNDERWAY REQUIREMENTS

  • Develop a standard watch rotation schedule to minimize fatigue.
  • Review underway requirements and prioritize to allow for adequate rest.
  • Allow daytime sleeping to reduce fatigue.
  • Minimize noise during daytime sleeping hours to allow for rest.
  • Review underway drills and non-essential training that adds to fatigue. Schedule drills and training to allow for daytime sleeping hours.
  • Train junior officers, senior non-commissions officers, department heads, XOs, and COs in fatigue minimization strategies.
  • Implement a fatigue testing strategy for use to evaluate crew fatigue and numerically score fatigue to provide guidance for CO’s when fatigue is becoming excessive.

3. INADEQUATE TRAINING OF THE CREWS OF THE SHIPS WE HAVE

This corrective action is difficult because a through training requirement analysis must be conducted prior to deciding on the specifics of the corrective actions listed here. However, we will once again guess at some of the requirements that need to be implemented that are not listed above.

a. SEAMANSHIP/SHIP DRIVING/STATION KEEPING

Driving a ship is a difficult challenge. Much harder than driving a car. In my controls and human factors class I learned that it was a 2nd or 3rd order control problem and these types of problems are very difficult for humans to solve. Thus ship drivers need lots of training and experience to be good. It seems the current training given and experience achieved are insufficient. Thus these ideas should be considered:

  • A seamanship training program be developed based on best human factors and training practices including performing a ship driving task analysis, using simulation training, models in an indoor ship basin, and developing shipboard games that can be played ashore or at sea to reinforce the ship handling lessons. These best practices and training tools can be built into the training programs suggested below.
  • Develop ship handing course for junior officers to complete before they arrive at their first ship to learn and practice common ship handling activities like man overboard, coming alongside (replenishment at sea), station keeping, maneuvering in restricted waters, contact tracking and avoidance in restricted waters.
  • Develop an advanced ship handing corse for department heads that refreshes/tests their ship handling skills and teaches them how to coach junior officers to develop their ship handling skills. This course should include simulator training and at sea ship handling practice including docking scenarios, anchoring, restricted waters, and collision avoidance.
  • Develop an advanced ship handling course for COs/XOs to refresh/test their ship handling skills and check their ability to coach junior officers ship handling skills. This course should include simulator training and at sea ship handling practice including docking scenarios, anchoring, restricted waters, and collision avoidance. The course should also include training on when the CO should be on the bridge and their duties when overseeing bridge operations in restricted waters including when to take control if the ship is in extremis (and practice of this skill).
  • Develop a simulator test for junior officers, department heads, XOs, and COs to test their ship handing and supervisory skills to be passed before reporting to a ship.
  • Develop bridge team training to be carried out onboard each ship to reinforce crew teamwork training.

b. NAVIGATION

  • Perform a task analysis of required navigation shipboard duties including new technology duties and duties if technology fails (without shipboard computerized aids).
  • Develop a navigation training program based on the task analysis for junior officers, department heads, XOs, and COs. This program should completed prior to shipboard tours and should include refresher training to be accomplished periodically while at sea.

c. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

  • Develop a department head leadership program to teach advanced root cause analysis for shipboard incidents.
  • Develop a junior officer root cause analysis course for simple (lower risk) problem analysis.
  • Develop a senior officer root cause analysis training program for XOs, COs, and line admiralty to teach advanced root cause analysis and review requirements when approving root cause analyses performed under their command. (Yes – the Navy does NOT know how to do this based on the current status of repeat incidents.)

2. INADEQUATE STAFFING OF THE SHIPS WE HAVE

  • Develop a senior officer (Captain and above) training program to teach when a CO or line responsible admiral should “push back” when given too demanding an operational schedule. This ability to say “no” should be based on testable, numerically measurable statistics. For example, shipboard fatigue testing, number of days at sea under certain levels of high operating tempo, number of days at sea without a port call, staffing levels in key jobs, …
  • Review undermanning and conduct a root cause analysis of the current problems being had at sea and develop an effective program to support at sea commands with trained personnel.

1. INADEQUATE NUMBER OF SHIPS FOR THE USA FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS

  • Develop a numerically valid and researched guidance for the number of ships required to support deployed forces in the current operating tempo.
  • Use the guidance developed above to demonstrate to the President and Congress the need for additional warships.
  • Evaluate the current mothball fleet and decide how many ships can be rapidly returned to service to support the current operating tempo.
  • Review the mothballed nuclear cruiser and carrier fleet to see if ships can be refueled, updated, and returned to service to support current operating tempo and create a better nuclear surface fleet carrier path.
  • Establish a new ship building program to support a modern 400 ship Navy by 2030.
  • Establish a recruiting and retention program to ensure adequate staff for the increased surface fleet.

Note that these are just ideas based on a Generic Cause Analysis of press releases and news reports. Just a single afternoon was spent by one individual developing this outline. Because of the magnitude of this problem and the lives at stake, I would recommend a real TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis of at least the last four major accidents and a Generic Cause Analysis of those incidents before corrective actions are initiated.

Of course, the Navy is already initiating corrective actions that seem to put the burden of improvement on the Commanding Officers who don’t have additional resources to solve these problems. Perhaps the Navy can realize that inadequate root cause analysis can be determined by the observation of repeat accidents and learn to adopt and apply advanced root cause analysis and support it from the CNO to the Chiefs and Junior Officers throughout the fleet. Then senior Navy officials can stand up and request from Congress and the President the resources needed to keep our young men and women safe at sea.

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Is punishment the best way to improve performance in the Navy?

September 20th, 2017 by

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In my decades of root cause analysis, less than 2% of incidents are caused by some sort of willful action that does not have a system cause. However, in many incident responses, companies discipline people for mistakes that were caused by system problem. This unwarranted punishment leads to:

  • Covering up problems.
  • Lying about what people did.
  • Morale issues when people are punished for things that were not their fault.
  • Mystery incidents that no one seems to know anything about (no one will talk).
  • Poor performance because the root causes of the problems are not being addressed.

Thus, I was disappointed when I saw the US Navy resort to discipline before the root cause analysis was completed after the collision of the USS Fitzgerald. Then again more discipline was used (this time against an Admiral) after the collision of the USS John S. McCain.

I wrote several articles about the collisions:

What is the Root Cause of the USS Fitzgerald Collision?

US Navy 7th Fleet Announces Blame for Crash of the USS Fitzgerald

USS Fitzgerald & USS John S McCain Collisions: Response to Feedback from a Reader

Several senior naval officers and others that discipline was needed for Navy personnel when a mission fails or a ship collides with another.

This brought to mind two sayings that I learned in the Navy. The first is:

The beatings will continue until morale improves.

The second is:

Why be fair when you can be arbitrary.

Do people in the Navy really respond to random discipline? The kind of discipline that’s been proven not to work in the civilian world?

I spent 7 years in the US Navy and have had close contacts with many people in the Navy since I left to start my civilian career. What I can tell you is this:

  1. Being at sea is different than working in a civilian job
  2. The Navy generally has a stricter set of operating rules than a civilian workforce does.
  3. There is a wider range of disciplinary actions that are available in the Navy than in the civilian word. (Although flogging and keel-hauling have been eliminated.)
  4. You can’t quit in the Navy if you have a bad boss.
  5. It’s difficult to fire someone that works for you if they are incompetent (you are stuck with those who you are assigned to lead).
  6. People ARE NOT different. They don’t become some sort of robot just because they joined the Navy.

Why did I include point #6 above? Because I’m often told that discipline is needed in the Navy to improve performance (One Admiral told me that it “sharpens the Commanding Officers game”).

It seems that some believe that senior naval officers (people commanding Navy ships – the Commanding Officers or COs) would try less hard, be less alert, and have worse performance if they didn’t have the threat of being relieved of command if they run into another ship or run aground.

Yes – the CO is ultimately responsible. Therefore, how could it NOT be the CO’s fault? They have ultimate authority on their ship … don’t they?

Let’s look at a an example. What if:

  • A ship was assigned a rigorous operational schedule of demanding technical missions.
  • The ship had several key pieces of equipment that that had been reported as broken (because of lack of time, parts, and money to perform maintenance).
  • The ship had many junior, barely qualified personnel serving in key positions because of the Navy’s planned rotation of officers and enlisted personnel and planned reduction of ashore training before new personnel arrived for their tour of duty.
  • The ship was undermanned because new ships were designed with new, smaller, crews but still had the same work to be performed as on older ships with 20-30% more people. This saved the Navy budget money – especially in the time of sequester.
  • The ship had several key personnel left ashore – with no replacement – because they were pregnant.
  • The CO was new to the ship and had little experience with this type of ship because he was assigned wartime duties ashore in Iraq during the Gulf Wars and missed an Executive Officer and a Department Head tours that would have provided more applicable experience and knowledge for this assignment.
  • People were fatigued after several tough evolutions but still had to drive the ship through a narrow, busy straight to get to their next assigned mission.

Is any of this under the CO’s control? Don’t these circumstances contribute to a mission failure if one occurs (like a collision). Would discipline make any of these factors change?

Does telling the CO that you are going to punish him (or her) if he or his crew makes a mistake make ANY difference?

Please leave me your comments. I’d be interested in what you have to say.

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TapRooT® featured on Worldwide Business with kathy ireland®

September 5th, 2017 by

Mark & Kathy discussing root cause analysis and human performance.

Watch the recorded television broadcast below.

USS Fitzgerald & USS John S McCain Collisions: Response to Feedback from a Reader

August 30th, 2017 by

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Here is an e-mail I received in response to my recent articles about the Navy’s collision root cause analysis:

As a former naval officer (and one who has navigated the infamous Strait of Malacca as Officer of the Deck on a warship bridge twice), I read your post with interest and wanted to respond.  You understandably criticize the Navy for taking disciplinary action early on in the investigation process, but you fail to understand the full scope of the military’s response to such incidents.  Yes, punishment was swift – right or wrong from a civilian perspective, that’s how the military holds its leaders accountable.  And make no mistake: The leadership of USS Fitzgerald is ultimately responsible and accountable for this tragedy.  (Same goes for the most recent collision involving USS John S. McCain, which also led to the ‘firing’ of the Commander of the 7th Fleet – a Vice Admiral nonetheless.)  That’s just how the military is, was, and always will be, because its disciplinary system is rooted in (and necessary for) war fighting.  

But don’t confuse accountability with cause.  No one in the Navy believes that relieving these sailors is the solution to the problem of at-sea collisions and therefore the ONLY cause.  I won’t speculate on causal factors, but I’m confident they will delve into training, seamanship, communications, over-reliance on technology and many other factors that could’ve been at work in these incidents.  It’s inaccurate and premature for anyone outside the investigation team to charge that the Navy’s root cause analysis began and ended with disciplinary actions.  How effective the final corrective actions are in preventing similar tragedies at-sea in the future will be the real measure of how effective their investigation and root cause analysis are, whether they use TapRooT, Apollo (my company uses both) or any other methodology.

I appreciate his feedback but I believe that many may be misunderstanding what I wrote and why I wrote it. Therefore, here is my response to his e-mail:

Thanks for your response. What I am going to say in response may seem pretty harsh but I’m not mad at you. I’m mad at those responsible for not taking action a decade ago to prevent these accidents today.

 

I’m also a previously qualified SWO who has been an OOD in some pretty tight quarters. The real question is … Why haven’t they solved this problem with prior accidents. The root causes of these collisions have existed for years (some might say over a decade or maybe two). Yet the fixes to prior accidents were superficial and DISCIPLINE was the main corrective action. This proves the Navy’s root cause analysis is inadequate in the past and, I fear, just as inadequate today.

 
These two ships weren’t at war and, even if they were, blaming the CO and the OOD almost never causes the real root causes of the issues to get fixed. 
 
I seem pretty worked up about this because I don’t want to see more young sailors needlessly killed so that top brass can make their deployment schedules work while cutting the number of ships (and the manning for the ships) and the budget for training and maintenance. Someone high up has to stand up and say to Congress and the President – enough is enough. This really is the CNO’s job. Making that stand is really supporting our troops. They deserve leadership that will make reasonable deployment and watch schedules and will demand the budget, staffing, and ships to meet our operational requirements.
 
By the way, long ago (and even more recently) I’ve seen the Navy punishment system work. Luckily, I was never on the receiving end (but I could have been if I hadn’t transferred off the ship just months before). And in another case, I know the CO who was punished. In each case, the CO who was there for the collision or the ship damage was punished for things that really weren’t his fault. Why? To protect those above him for poor operational, maintenance, budget, and training issues. Blaming the CO is a convenient way to stop blame from rising to Admirals or Congress and the President.
 
That’s why I doubt there will be a real root cause analysis of these accidents. If there is, it will require immediate reductions in operation tempo until new training programs are implemented, new ships can be built, and manning can be increased to support the new ships (and our current ships). How long will this take? Five to 10 years at best. Of course it has taken over 20 years for the problem to get this bad (it started slowly in the late 80s). President Trump says he wants to rebuild the military – this is his chance to do something about that.
 
Here are some previous blog articles that go back about a decade (when the blog started) about mainly submarine accidents and discipline just to prove this really isn’t a recent phenomenon. It has been coming for a while…. 
 
USS Hartford collision:
 
 
 
 
USS Greeneville collision:
 
 
USS San Francisco hits undersea mountain:
 
 
USS Hampton ORSE Board chemistry cheating scandal:
 
 
I don’t write about every accident or people would think I was writing for the Navy Times, but you get the idea. Note, some links in the posts are missing because of the age of these posts, but it will give you an idea that the problems we face today aren’t new (even if they are worse) and the Navy’s top secret root cause system – discipline those involved – hasn’t worked.
 
Are these problems getting worse because of a lack of previous thorough root cause analysis and corrective actions? Unfortunately, we don’t have the data to see a trend. How many more young men and women need to die before we take effective action – I hope none but a fear it will be many.
 
Thanks again for your comment and Best Regards,
 
Mark Paradies
President, System Improvements, Inc.
The TapRooT® Folks

I’m not against the Navy or the military. I support our troops. I am against the needless loss of life. We need to fix this problem before we have a real naval battle (warfare at sea) and suffer unnecessary losses because of our lack of preparedness. If we can’t sail our ships we will have real problems fighting with them.

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Where did you eat last weekend? (or, why do companies continue to not learn from their mistakes?)

July 24th, 2017 by

Happy Monday. I hope everyone had a good weekend and got recharged for the week ahead.

Every few weeks, I get a craving for Mexican food. Maybe a sit-down meal with a combo plate and a Margarita, maybe Tex-Mex or maybe traditional. It’s all good.

Sometimes, though, a simple California Style Burrito does the trick. This weekend was one of those weekends. Let’s see, what are my choices…? Moe’s, Willy’s, Qdoba, Chipotle?

Chipotle? What??!!!

Unfortunately, Chipotle is back in the news. More sick people. Rats falling from the ceiling. Not good.

It seems like we have been here before. I must admit I did not think they would survive last time, but they did. What about this time? In the current world of social media we shall see.

For those of us in safety or quality, the story is all too familiar. The same problem keeps happening. Over and Over…and Over

So why do companies continue to not learn from mistakes? A few possible reasons:

**They don’t care
**They are incompetent
**They don’t get to true root causes when investigating problems
**They write poor corrective actions
**They don’t have the systems in place for good performance or performance improvement

TapRooT® can help with the last three. Please join us at a future course; you can see the schedule and enroll HERE

So, what do you think? Why do companies not learn from their mistakes? Leave comments below.

By the way, my Burrito from Moe’s was great!

“Human Error” by Maintenance Crew is “Cause” of NYC Subway Derailment. Two Supervisors Suspended Without Pay.

June 29th, 2017 by

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The New York Daily News says that a piece of track was left between the rails during repair of track on the NYC subway system. That loose track may have caused the derailment of an eight car train.

The rule is that any track less than 19.5 feet either be bolted down or removed. It seems that others say that the “practice” is somewhat different. This piece of track was only 13.5 feet long and was not bolted down.

But don’t worry. Two supervisors have been suspended without pay. And workers are riding the railed looking for other loose equipment between the rails. Problem solved. Human error root cause fixed…

Construction Safety: Human Cost, OSHA Fines and Lawsuits…

June 5th, 2017 by

Knowing that each year about 900 construction workers do not come home to their families after work, safety on construction work sites must be taken seriously.

AGC, the Associated General Contractors of America recently published a study together with Virginia Tech, “Preventing Fatalities in the Construction Industry”. There are some interesting findings:

  • Dangerous Lunch Hour: construction site fatalities peak at noon, and are much lower on Fridays than Monday through Thursday
  • Small Contractors (less than 9 employees) are overrepresented in the statistics, with a fatality rate of 26 per 100,000 workers
  • Fully 1/3 of fatalities are from falls, and about 29% from Transportation incidents with e.g trucks or pickups
  • More experienced workers are not safer: fatalities start increasing after age 35 and keep growing so that 65 year olds are at the highest risk
  • Industrial projects are the most dangerous, followed by Residential and Heavy construction projects

The consequences of a fatality are devastating. There is a great human cost where families will have to deal with grief as well as financial issues. For the company there may be OSHA fines, law suits and criminal investigations. There really is no excuse for a builder not to have an active safety program, no matter how small the company.

Basic safety activities include providing and checking PPE and fall protection, correct use of scaffolding and ladders, on- going safety training, check- ins and audits. It is also a good idea to actively promote a safety culture, and to use a root cause analysis tool to investigate accidents and near misses, and prevent them from happening again.

The TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis methodology is a proven way of getting to the bottom of incidents, and come up with effective corrective actions. Focus is on human performance, and how workers can be separated from hazards like electricity, falls or moving equipment.

We can organize on- site training, or start by signing up for a public course. We offer the 5-Day TapRooT® Advanced Root Cause Analysis Team Leader Training as well as the introductory 2-Day TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis Training class.

Be proactive, do not let preventable accidents catch up with you… call us today!

#TapRooT_RCA #safety

Monday Motivation: Modify your dreams or magnify your skills!

June 5th, 2017 by

  You must either modify your dreams or magnify your skills. – Jim Rohn

“Dream big,”” they say.

“If you can dream it, you can become it,” they say.

It’s the season of high school and college graduations, and success clichés are in the air.  And, to be fair, there is a certain amount of vision that can be gleaned from inspirational quotes.  But there is more to reaching success in your career than simply having a dream.  Don’t settle and modify your dreams.  You can bridge the gap of where you are now to where you want to be by magnifying your skills.

We can help you do just that!

If you want to magnify your leadership skills, read the TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis Leadership Lessons book.

If you want to magnify your skills of conducting fast simple investigations, read the Using the Essential TapRooT® Techniques to Investigate Low-to-Medium Risk Incidents book or attend our 2-day TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis Training.  We have made major strides in making TapRooT® easy to use. We even have a new five step process for doing a low-to-medium risk incident investigation.

If you want to magnify your skills of conducting major investigations, learn the whole TapRooT® process and tools for investigating high potential and high risk incidents by reading the TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis for Major Investigations book or attending our 5-day TapRooT® Advanced Root Cause Analysis Team Leader Training.  The book and course explain the entire 7-step TapRooT® System and all the TapRooT® Tools.

If you want to get ahead of accidents, incidents, and quality issues, then magnify your proactive/audit skills by reading the TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis for Audits and Proactive Performance Improvement book.

Don’t settle for less than what you want to do with your career.  Magnify your skills!

Time for Advanced Root Cause Analysis of Special Operations Sky Diving Deaths?

May 31st, 2017 by

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Click on the image above for a Navy Times article about the accident at a recent deadly demonstration jump over the Hudson River.

Perhaps it’s time for a better root cause analysis of the problems causing these accidents?

Root Cause Tip: “Enforcement Needs Improvement” – You Can’t Train Obedience/Compliance/Positive Behavior

May 26th, 2017 by

This is a quick clarification to stop a definite no-no in poorly developed corrective actions.

You find evidence during your root cause analysis to support the root cause “Enforcement NI” based on the following statements from your Root Cause Tree® Dictionary for a particular causal factor:

  • Was enforcement of the SPAC (Standards, Policies, Administrative Controls) seen as inconsistent by the employees?
  • Has failure to follow SPAC in the past gone uncorrected or unpunished?
  • Did management fail to provide positive incentives for people to follow the SPAC?
  • Was there a reward for NOT following the SPAC (for example: saving time, avoiding discomfort).
  • When supervisors or management noticed problems with worker behavior, did they fail to coach workers and thereby leave problems similar to this causal factor uncorrected?

But then if you create a corrective action to retrain, remind, and reemphasize the rules, directed at the employee or in rare occasions the immediate supervisor, your investigation started on track and jumped tracks at the end.

Now, I am okay with an alert going out to the field for critical to safety or operation issues as a key care about reminder, but that does not fix the issues identified with the evidence above. If you use Train/Re-Train as a corrective action, then you imply that the person must not have known how to perform the job in the first place. If that were the case, root causes under the Basic Cause Category of “Training” should have been selected.

Training covers the person’s knowledge, skills and abilities to perform a specific task safely and successfully. Training does not ensure sustainment of proper actions to perform the task; supervision acknowledgement, reward and discipline from supervision, senior leadership and peers ensure acceptance and sustainment for correct task behaviors.

Don’t forget, it is just as easy for supervision to ignore unsafe behavior as it is for an employee to deviate from a task (assuming the task was doable in the first place). Reward and discipline applies to changing supervision’s behavior as well.

Something else to evaluate. If the root cause of Enforcement NI shows up frequently, make sure that you are not closing the door prematurely on the Root Cause Tree® Dictionary Near Root Causes of:

  • Oversight/Employee Relations (Audits should be catching this and the company culture should be evaluated).
  • Corrective Actions (If you tried to fix this issue before, why did it fail?).

Remember, you can’t train obedience/compliance/positive behavior. Finally, if you get stuck on developing a corrective active for Enforcement NI or any of our root causes, stop and read your Corrective Action Helper®.  

Learn more by attending one of our upcoming TapRooT® Courses or just call 865.539.2139 and ask a question if you get stuck after being trained.

Healthcare Professionals! Please come visit the TapRooT® Booth at the NPSF Conference

May 10th, 2017 by

If you are coming to the conference (May 17 – 19), please stop by and see us at Booth 300; Per Ohstrom and I will both be there.

Of course TapRooT® can help you with patient safety and reducing Sentinal Events. But there are many more ways to use TapRoot® in your hospital:

Improve Employee Safety and reduce injuries

Improve Quality, reduce human error, and make your processes more efficient

We hope to see you there. We have a free gift for the first 500 people, so don’t miss out!

Are You Writing the Same Corrective Actions?

April 17th, 2017 by

Repeating the same corrective actions over and over again defeats the purpose of a quality root cause analysis investigation. If you spend the time investigating and digging deeper to find the REAL root cause, you should write the most effective corrective actions you can to ensure it was all worth the resources put into it. Instructor & Equifactor® and TapRooT® Expert, Ken Reed, talks about corrective actions and how to make them new and effective for each root cause.

 

Take a TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis course today to learn our effective and efficient RCA methodology. 

Why Does TapRooT® Exist?

March 28th, 2017 by

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If you are a TapRooT® User, you may think that the TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis System exists to help people find root causes. But there is more to it than that. TapRooT® exists to:

  • Save lives
  • Prevent injuries
  • Improve product/service quality
  • Improve equipment reliability
  • Make work easier and more productive
  • Stop sentinel events
  • Stop the cycle of blaming people for system caused errors

And we are accomplishing our mission around the world.

Of course, there is still a lot to do. If you would like to learn more about using TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis to help your company accomplish these things, get more information about TapRooT® HERE or attend one of our courses (get info HERE).

If you would like to learn how others have used TapRooT® to meet the objectives laid out above, see the Success Stories at:

http://www.taproot.com/archives/category/success-stories

Top 3 Reasons for Bad Root Cause Analysis and How You Can Overcome Them…

February 7th, 2017 by

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I’ve heard many high level managers complain that they see the same problems happen over and over again. They just can’t get people to find and fix the problems’ root causes. Why does this happen and what can management do to overcome these issues? Read on to find out.

 

1. BLAME

Blame is the number one reason for bad root cause analysis.

Why?

Because people who are worried about blame don’t fully cooperate with an investigation. They don’t admit their involvement. They hold back critical information. Often this leads to mystery accidents. No one knows who was involved, what happened, or why it happened.

As Bart Simpson says:

“I didn’t do it.”
“Nobody saw me do it.”
“You can’t prove anything.”

Blame is so common that people take it for granted.

Somebody makes a mistake and what do we do? Discipline them.

If they are a contractor, we fire them. No questions asked.

And if the mistake was made by senior management? Sorry … that’s not how blame works. Blame always flows downhill. At a certain senior level management becomes blessed. Only truly horrific accidents like the Deepwater Horizon or Bhopal get senior managers fired or jailed. Then again, maybe those accidents aren’t bad enough for discipline for senior management.

Think about the biggest economic collapse in recent history – the housing collapse of 2008. What senior banker went to jail?

But be an operator and make a simple mistake like pushing the wrong button or a mechanic who doesn’t lock out a breaker while working on equipment? You may be fired or have the feds come after you to put you in jail.

Talk to Kurt Mix. He was a BP engineer who deleted a few text messages from his personal cell phone AFTER he had turned it over to the feds. He was the only person off the Deepwater Horizon who faced criminal charges. Or ask the two BP company men who represented BP on the Deepwater Horizon and faced years of criminal prosecution. 

How do you stop blame and get people to cooperate with investigations? Here are two best practices.

A. Start Small …

If you are investigating near-misses that could have become major accidents and you don’t discipline people who spill the beans, people will learn to cooperate. This is especially true if you reward people for participating and develop effective fixes that make the work easier and their jobs less hazardous. 

Small accidents just don’t have the same cloud of blame hanging over them so if you start small, you have a better chance of getting people to cooperate even if a blame culture has already been established.

B. Use a SnapCharT® to facilitate your investigation and report to management.

We’ve learned that using a SnapCharT® to facilitate an investigation and to show the results to management reduces the tendency to look for blame. The SnapCharT® focuses on what happened and “who did it” becomes less important.

Often, the SnapCharT® shows that there were several things that could have prevented the accident and that no one person was strictly to blame. 

What is a SnapCharT®? Attend any TapRooT® Training and you will learn how to use them. See:

TapRooT® Training

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2. FIRST ASK WHAT NOT WHY

Ever see someone use 5-Whys to find root causes? They start with what they think is the problem and then ask “Why?” five times. Unfortunately this easy methods often leads investigators astray.

Why?

Because they should have started by asking what before they asked why.

Many investigators start asking why before they understand what happened. This causes them to jump to conclusions. They don’t gather critical evidence that may lead them to the real root causes of the problem. And they tend to focus on a single Causal Factor and miss several others that also contributed to the problem. 

How do you get people to ask what instead of why?

Once again, the SnapCharT® is the best tool to get investigators focused on what happened, find the incidents details, identify all the Causal Factors and the information about each Causal Factor that the investigator needs to identify each problem’s root causes.

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3. YOU MUST GO BEYOND YOUR CURRENT KNOWLEDGE

Many investigators start their investigation with a pretty good idea of the root causes they are looking for. They already know the answers. All they have to do is find the evidence that supports their hypothesis.

What happens when an investigator starts an investigation by jumping to conclusions?

They ignore evidence that is counter to their hypothesis. This problem is called a:

Confirmation Bias

It has been proven in many scientific studies.

But there is an even bigger problem for investigators who think they know the answer. They often don’t have the training in human factors and equipment reliability to recognize the real root causes of each of the Causal Factors. Therefore, they only look for the root causes they know about and don’t get beyond their current knowledge.

What can you do to help investigators look beyond their current knowledge and avoid confirmation bias?

Have them use the SnapCharT® and the TapRooT® Root Cause Tree® Diagram when finding root causes. You will be amazed at the root causes your investigators discover that they previously would have overlooked.

How can your investigators learn to use the Root Cause Tree® Diagram? Once again, send them to TapRooT® Training.

THAT’S IT…

The TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis System can help your investigators overcome the top 3 reasons for bad root cause analysis. And that’s not all. There are many other advantages for management and investigators (and employees) when people use TapRooT® to solve problems.

If you haven’t tried TapRooT® to solve problems, you don’t know what you are missing.

If your organization faces:

  • Quality Issues
  • Safety Incidents
  • Repeat Equipment Failures
  • Sentinel Events
  • Environmental Incidents
  • Cost Overruns
  • Missed Schedules
  • Plant Downtime

You need to be apply the best root cause analysis system: TapRooT®.

Learn more at: 

http://www.taproot.com/products-services/about-taproot

And find the dates and locations for our public TapRooT® Training at:

 http://www.taproot.com/store/Courses/

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The 7 Secrets of Root Cause Analysis – Video

December 12th, 2016 by

Hello everyone,

Here is a video that discusses some root cause tips, common problems with root cause analysis, and how TapRooT® can help. I hope you enjoy!

Like what you see? Why not join us at the next course? You can see the schedule and enroll HERE

Monday Accident & Lessons Learned: Overspeed at Fletton Junction

September 19th, 2016 by

This incident notice is from the UK Rail Investigation Branch about an overspeed incident at Fletton Junction, Peterborough on 11 September 2015.

At around 17:11 hrs on 11 September 2015, the 14:25 hrs Virgin Trains East Coast passenger train service from Newcastle to London King’s Cross passed through Fletton Junction, near Peterborough at 51 mph (82 km/h) around twice the permitted speed of 25 mph (40 km/h). This caused the carriages to lurch sideways resulting in minor injuries to three members of staff and one passenger.

It is likely that the train driver had forgotten about the presence of the speed restriction because he was distracted and fatigued due to issues related to his family. Lineside signs and in-cab warnings may have contributed to him not responding appropriately as he approached the speed restriction and engineering controls did not prevent the overspeeding. Neither Virgin Trains East Coast, nor the driver, had realised that family-related distraction and fatigue were likely to be affecting the safety of his driving. Virgin Trains East Coast route risk assessment had not recognised the overspeeding risks particular to Fletton Junction and Network Rail had not identified that a speed limit sign at the start of the speed restriction was smaller than required by its standards.

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The incident could have had more serious consequences if the train had derailed or overturned. The risk of this was present because the track layout was designed for a maximum speed of 27 mph (43 km/h).
As a consequence of this investigation, RAIB has made five recommendations. Two addressed to Virgin Trains East Coast relate to enhancing the management of safety critical staff with problems related to their home life, and considering such issues during the investigation of unsafe events.

A recommendation addressed to Virgin Trains East Coast and an associated recommendation addressed to Network Rail relate to assessing and mitigating risks at speed restrictions.

A further recommendation to Network Rail relates to replacement of operational signage when this is non-compliant with relevant standards.

RAIB report also includes learning points relating to managing personal problems that could affect the safety performance of drivers. A further learning point, arising because of a delay in reporting the incident, stresses the importance of drivers promptly reporting incidents which could have caused track damage. A final learning point encourages a full understanding of the effectiveness of safety mitigation provided by infrastructure and signalling equipment.

For more information see:

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Monday Accident & Lessons Learned: Human Error That Should Not Occur

July 25th, 2016 by

This Accident shares a “Call Back” Report from the Aviation Safety Reporting System that is applicable far beyond aviation.

In this case, the pilot was fatigued and just wanted to “get home.” He had a “finish the mission” focus that could have cost him his life. Here’s an excerpt:

I saw nothing of the runway environment…. I had made no mental accommodation to do a missed approach as I just knew that my skills would allow me to land as they had so many times in past years. The only conscious control input that I can recall is leveling at the MDA [Rather than continuing to the DA? –Ed.] while continuing to focus outside the cockpit for the runway environment. It just had to be there! I do not consciously remember looking at the flight instruments as I began…an uncontrolled, unconscious 90-degree turn to the left, still looking for the runway environment.

To read about this near-miss and the lessons learned, see:

http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/cb/cb_436.pdf

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What does a bad day look like?

May 17th, 2016 by

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A lot of bad days start with bad decisions.  For example, when you decide to take a selfie with a 4-foot rattlesnake… (Read story.)

Monday Accident & Lessons Learned: What Not To Do During Flooding

May 16th, 2016 by

The following is a video of a fatal accident. The vehicle drove around a tow truck sent to block the underpass and past a worker waiving his arms to stop her. She drove into water about 17 feet deep. DON’T watch the video if it will upset you. For others, hopefully you can use this to teach others to avoid standing water during flooding.

What Does a Bad Day Look Like?

May 3rd, 2016 by

When you’re late for work because a truck fell on you, perhaps?

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Understanding & Stopping Human Error – EXCLUSIVE 2-Day Course

April 29th, 2016 by

This course is scheduled for August 1-2, 2016 in San Antonio, Texas just prior to the 2016 Global TapRooT® Summit.

LEARN ABOUT TEN MORE EXCLUSIVE PRESUMMIT COURSES! (Click here.)

Nudging Human Behavior in the Rail Industry

April 20th, 2016 by

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A colleague at a recent Rail Safety conference pointed me to this article on how to change people’s behavior on rail lines in London. How do we influence people to:
– put trash in trash bins
– be courteous while playing music
– keep feet off the train seats

They’ve tried signs and warnings. I think we can all agree those have limited effect. There are audible reminders. The escalators in Atlanta Airport talk to you continuously on the way down to the trains.

Here are some other (gentler) ways the London Underground is trying to influence passengers to do what is required.

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Success Stories

If you are a TapRooT® User, you may think that the TapRooT® Root Cause Analysis System exists to help people find root causes. But there is more to it than that. TapRooT® exists to: Save lives Prevent injuries Improve product/service quality Improve equipment reliability Make work easier and more productive Stop sentinel events Stop the …

We held our first on-site TapRooT Training in mid-1995. Shortly after the training we had another…

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