Monday Accident & Lessons Learned: Root Cause Analysis Of St. Lucie Security Incident and NRC Confirmatory Order
Everything is suppose to be inspected before it enters a nuclear site. But a container made it into St. Lucie nuclear power plant without being inspected. You can read more about this at:
Here are the corrective actions from the Confirmatory Order:
a. FPL will ensure current FPL Site procedures clearly address requirements for search thoroughness and completeness and that current FPL Site training lesson plans address this requirement.
b. FPL will proceduralize fleet-wide security force personnel standards of performance and professionalism in a Conduct of Security procedure. Training on the new procedure was conducted for all security force personnel and will be provided to newly hired security force personnel.
c. FPL will create a fleet security organization, and will increase on-site staffing of security organizations at St. Lucie, Turkey Point, and Seabrook Station to augment oversight of the contract security force. FPL will evaluate the security organization at Point Beach to determine management staffing needs.
d. FPL will proceduralize management observations of the security force by FPL security personnel.
e. FPL will conduct a fleet-wide briefing of security force supervisors and officers regarding this event and reinforcing proper search methods and requirements.
f. FPL will establish a fleet-wide vehicle and material search procedure to provide consistency in processes. This procedure will include a standardized search checklist, provisions for documentation of vehicle and material search completion, and guidance to address and mitigate any factors that may impact security officers’ ability to perform the search.
g. FPL will establish a fleet-wide lesson plan for individual tasks concerning vehicle and material searches. Training will be conducted for future new hire sessions for security officers and annual requalifications.
h. FPL agrees to complete all corrective actions and enhancements identified in Section V within nine months of the date of issuance of the Confirmatory Order. Training on the new guidelines and lesson plan will be completed beginning the cycle following the approval date of the relevant procedure and the lesson plan.
The original Safeguard was a “human performance” Safeguard that had several policy/procedure/training “quasi-Safeguards.”
It seems that the corrective actions try to make these quasi-Safeguards stronger and continue to rely on a single human-performance Safeguard. The addition of management audits will be used to make sure the training/policy/procedure quasi-Safeguards are being applied.
It’s always interesting to see “more training” used as a corrective action. But this is always a fairly weak Safeguard even when audits are used to make sure that the policies are being used.
QUESTION: Could have they done something else?
What ideas could be implemented to:
1. Reduce deliveries inside the protected area?
2. Automate inspections?
3. Secure deliveries inside the protected area?
Just three ideas. Does anyone have others?